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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 09-cv-01051-REB-KMT
JOHN NASIOUS, 
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF COLORADO - OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR BILL RITTER; 
NURSE MARTHA MUELLER, Physician Health Partners,
DR. BARRY GOLDSMITH, Physician Health Partners,
PAULA FRANTZ M.D. CMO, Colorado Dept. of Corrections,
STEPHEN KREIBS M.D. - Physician, Health Partners Agent of Record,
P.A. BRIAN WEBSTER, Physician Health Partners (Ft Myers, FL),
PA TEJEENDER SINGH, Physician Health Partners,
ARISTEDES ZAVARAS, Executive Director CDOC,
JOSEPH GARY FORTUNADO DO., Physician Health Partners,
P.A. JOANN STOCK, Physician Health Partners,
NURSE NANCY WHITE, Physician Health Partners,
JOSEPH WERMERS, M.D., Physician Health Partners,
CO ST. MARTIN, Colorado Dept. of Corrections,
CO REGINA JOHNSON, Medical Department Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 
CAPTAIN WEINGARDT, Colorado Dept. of Corrections,
LT MARK BOLD, Colorado Dept. of Corrections,
LT JASON ZWIRN, Colorado Dept. of Corrections,,
CATHIE HOLST, Manager of Correctional Legal Services,
ADA Coordinator, AIC CDOC,
ADRIENNE JACOBSON, Legal Assistant AIC/ADA Coordinator CDOC, 
SGT BECKY BALL, Colorado Dept. of Corrections,
LT. JIMERSON, Colorado Dept. of Corrections,
MS. HAVERLY LIBRAIAN, Colorado Dept. of Corrections,
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, all in their individual and official capacities,
Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Kathleen M. Tafoya
United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the court on the following motions:
(1) Defendants Dr. Barry Goldsmith, Stephen Krebs, M.D., P.A. Brian Webster, P.A. 
Tejinder Singh, Joseph Gary Fortunato, D.O., P.A. Jo Ann Stock, Nurse Nancy White, and CO 
Regina Johnson’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to Plaintiff’s Claim for 
Deprivation of Eighth Amendment Right to be Free from Cruel and Unusual Punishment (Doc. 
No. 149, filed January 4, 2011);
(2) Defendants Captain Winger, Major Johnson, Lt. Mark Bold, Lt. Shane McMahill, 
Lt. Jason Zwirn, CO St. Martin, P.A. Brian Webster, CO Kenneth Lefever, Sgt. Becky Ball, and 
Lt. Jimerson’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to Plaintiff’s Claim for Retaliation 
and Exercise of First Amendment Protected Rights (Doc. No. 150, filed January 4, 2011);
(3) Defendant State of Colorado - Office of the Governor Bill Ritter’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff’s Remaining Claim Against Defendant Governor Ritter - 
Official Capacity for Deprivation of Rights Secured by the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(Doc. No. 151, filed January 4, 2011);
(4) Defendants Dr. Barry Goldsmith, Paula Frantz, M.D., C.M.O., Stephen Krebs, 
M.D., Joseph Gary Fortunato, D.O., P.A. Brian Webster, P.A. Tejender Singh, P.A. JoAnn 
Stock, and Joseph J. Wermers’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff’s Claim for 
Deprivation of Rights Secured by the Americans with Disabilities Act (Doc. No. 152, filed 
January 4, 2011);
2
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(5) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to Plaintiffs Claim for 
Punitive Damages for Deprivation of Rights Secured by the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(Doc. No. 155, filed January 5, 2011); and
(6) Defendants Aristedes Zavaras, Cathie Holst, Adrienne Jacobson, and Ms. 
Heverly’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to Plaintiff’s Claim for Deprivation of 
Rights Secured by the Americans with Disabilities Act (Doc. No. 158, filed January 5, 2011).
Plaintiff filed his responses to the Motions on January 25, 2011. (Doc. Nos. 171 and 
171.) Defendants did not file replies. The motions are ripe for the court’s recommendation and 
ruling.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and the parties’ submissions 
with respect to this Recommendation.
Plaintiff is an inmate with the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) at Sterling 
Correctional Facility (SC.). (Compl. at 3, ^ 1.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff generally alleges that, 
from September 2006 through October 2009, Defendants provided him inadequate medical 
treatment, or denied him treatment altogether, for his migraine headaches, epilepsy, and 
degenerative disc disease.1 (Id. at 11, 19-23.) Next, Plaintiff alleges that he was removed from
1Plaintiff misspells many of the defendants’ names. The court, hereafter, will refer to the 
defendants with the correct spellings provided by the defendants in their motions. Additionally, 
to the extent Defendant Ritter has been sued in his official capacity as Governor of the State of 
Colorado, the court would normally follow the dictates of Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) and substitute the 
new Governor, John Hickenlooper, but the court declines to do so in light of the conclusions 
reached in this Recommendation.
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the general inmate population and the prison’s “Therapeutic Community” program, refused 
medical treatment, fired from his prison job, and had his property confiscated because he tried to 
seek medical attention and complained about the adequacy of the treatment he was receiving.
(Id. at 24-31.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants failed to recognize his migraine headaches, 
epilepsy, and spinal stenosis as disabilities and failed accommodate these disabilities in his 
prison employment and the conditions of his confinement. (Id. at 32-40.) Finally, Plaintiff 
alleges that on November 7, 2008, while “being transfered [sic] back from medical,” he was 
“subjected to a mass strip search which included a completely naked body cavity search in the 
presence of multiple other inmates and female staff.” (Id. at 42.)
Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges (1) claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that 
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and, therefore, violated his rights 
under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; (2) claims pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 that Defendants retaliated against him for exercising his rights to medical 
treatment and to petition the government for grievances; and (3) claims pursuant to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) that Defendants discriminated against him based on 
his epilepsy, migraines, and spinal stenosis by failing to recognize these impairments as 
disabilities and failing to accommodate these disabilities in his employment and the conditions 
of his confinement.2 Plaintiff has sued all defendants in their official and individual capacities
^Plaintiff’s Claim Four, that his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures were violated, was dismissed by Senior District Judge Zita L. Weinshienk 
on February 22, 2011. (See Doc. No.184.)
4
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(id. at 2, 43), seeking injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and legal fees 
and costs (id. at 45).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgments as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing an absence of evidence to 
support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). “Once 
the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a 
genuine issue for trial on a material matter.” Concrete Works, Inc. v. City & County o f Denver, 
36 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). The nonmoving party 
may not rest solely on the allegations in the pleadings, but must instead designate “specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c). A disputed fact is “material” if “under the substantive law it is essential to the proper 
disposition of the claim.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir.1998) 
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute is “genuine” if the 
evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 
Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson, 
477 U.S. at 248).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court may consider only admissible 
evidence. See Johnson v. Weld County, Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2010). The 
factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the
5
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party opposing summary judgment. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1517. Moreover, because 
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court, “review[s] his pleadings and other papers liberally and 
hold[s] them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys.” Trackwell v. United 
States, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding allegations of a pro se complaint “to less stringent standards 
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). At the summary judgment stage of litigation, a 
plaintiff’s version of the facts must find support in the record. Thomson v. Salt Lake Cnty, 584 
F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2009). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of 
which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court 
should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Thomson, 584 F.3d at 1312.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and First 
Amendment claims for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing 
suit. (Doc. No. 149 at 24-25; Doc. No. 150 at 24-25.) The Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA), Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), provides: “No action shall be brought with respect to 
prison conditions under § 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available 
are exhausted.” “There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that 
unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 200-01 (2007);
6
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Woodfordv. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (“Exhaustion is no longer left to the discretion of the 
district court, but is mandatory.”). However, “the burden of proof for the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies in a suit governed by the PLRA lies with the defendant.” Roberts v. 
Barreras, 484 F.3d 1236, 1241 (2007). As such, Defendants have the burden of proof on the 
exhaustion issue and Defendants must establish every element of this affirmative defense by 
sufficient, competent evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that he exhausted his 
administrative remedies on his Eighth Amendment and First Amendment claims. However, as 
set forth above, the burden is not on the plaintiff to sufficiently plead exhaustion or attach 
exhibits proving exhaustion. Jones, 549 U.S. at 201. Defendants have failed to attach any 
affidavits or other evidence, and have failed to state specific facts supporting their affirmative 
defense. Instead, Defendants simply rest on the conclusory assertions contained in their motions, 
which is insufficient on a motion for summary judgment. See BancOklahomaMort. Corp. v. 
Capital Title Co., 194 F.3d 1089, 1097 (10th Cir. 1999). As Defendants have not met their 
burden of establishing every element regarding Plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies, their motions in this regard are properly denied.
B. Liability of Defendants in Their Official Capacities
Some of the defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for monetary 
relief against them in their official capacities. (See Doc. No. 149 at 10-12; Doc. No. 150 at 8-9.) 
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
7
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prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. It has been interpreted to bar a suit by a 
citizen against the citizen’s own state in federal court. Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1552 
(10th Cir. 1995). Suits against state officials in their official capacity should be treated as suits 
against the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). This is because a suit against a state 
official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the official’s office and therefore is no 
different from a suit against the state itself. Will v. Mich. Dep’t o f State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 
(1989). The Eleventh Amendment thus shields state officials, acting in their official capacities, 
from claims for monetary relief. See Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 2007). 
Moreover, a § 1983 action may only be brought against a person. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Neither 
states nor state officers sued in their official capacity for monetary damages are persons within 
the meaning of § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71.
Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief against the defendants in their official capacities 
constitute claims against the Colorado Department of Corrections. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of 
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity 
is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office”). Therefore, 
Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims for monetary relief against the defendants are barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment, and Defendants Goldsmith, Krebs, Webster, Singh, Fortunato, Stock, 
White, Johnson, Winger, Bolt, McMahill, Zwirn, St. Martin, Webster, Lefever, Ball, and 
Jimerson are entitled to summary judgment in this regard. See id.; Bennett, 17 F.3d at 1267.
8
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C. Liability of Defendants in Their Individual Capacities
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar actions for damages against state officials in their 
individual capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 164 (1985). Personal capacity suits 
pursuant to § 1983 seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he or 
she takes under color of state law. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-67.
1. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment is violated if a 
defendant’s “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To establish a claim for deliberate 
indifference, a plaintiff must first prove that, objectively, his medical need is “sufficiently 
serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A medical need is sufficiently serious 
“if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so 
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” 
Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Second, the plaintiff 
must prove that, subjectively, the prison official “kn[ew] of and disregarded] an excessive risk 
to inmate health and safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. That is, “the official must both be aware 
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 
and he must also draw the inference.” Id. Although an Eighth Amendment claim regarding 
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need often involves an official’s failure to treat a 
prisoner’s serious medical condition properly, it may also arise when a prison official acts with
9
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deliberate indifference in preventing a prisoner from receiving treatment or denying him access 
to medical personnel capable of evaluating the need for treatment. See Sealock v. Colorado, 218 
F.3d 1205, 12011 (10th Cir. 2000).
“Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged 
constitutional violation.” Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008). In 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that supervisors can only be held liable for their own
misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,___U.S.___ , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Under this decision,
a supervisor cannot incur liability under § 1983 for his mere knowledge of a subordinate’s 
wrongdoing. Id. After Iqbal, the Tenth Circuit has held that a plaintiff may succeed in a § 1983 
suit against a defendant-supervisor by demonstrating: “(1) the defendant promulgated, created, 
implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused 
the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish 
the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199-1200 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (citing Summum v. City o f Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1000 (10th Cir. 2002)). Even under 
pre- Iqbal standards, a plaintiff had to allege “a deliberate, intentional act by the supervisor to 
violate constitutional rights,” which was present if “the defendant-supervisor personally directed 
the violation or had actual knowledge of the violation and acquiesced in its continuance.” 
Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 994-95 (10th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff also had to allege an 
“affirmative link” between “the constitutional deprivation and either the supervisor’s personal 
participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise,” so as to establish 
causation. Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Green v.
10
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Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1997)); see also Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1201 n.9; Stidham 
v. Peace Officer Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1156-57 (10th Cir. 2001).
a. Defendant Goldsmith
Plaintiff alleges on September 17, 2008, Defendant Goldsmith was deliberately 
indifferent to his medical needs “by refusing to prescribe [him] the proper medication despite 
acknowledging [his] need for it.” (Compl. at 20, ^ 3.) In his Affidavit, Defendant Goldsmith 
states that between September 26, 2006, and August 12, 2009, he had one office visit with the 
plaintiff on September 17, 2008. (Doc. No. 149-1 [Goldsmith Aff.], ^ 6.) Defendant Goldsmith 
also states that upon examination, he found no evidence of back pain requiring pain medication 
and found Plaintiff’s behavior not consistent with a patient in pain. (Ex. 1, ^ 7.) Defendant 
Goldsmith also found Plaintiff has a history of abusing Darvocet and Imitrex. (Id.) It was Dr. 
Goldsmith’s clinical judgment that pain medication was not indicated, and he denied pain 
medication accordingly. (Id.)
Plaintiff has attempted to create a fact issue to preclude the entry of summary judgment 
by creating an affidavit using an exact duplicate of paragraphs 1 through 72 of his Complaint and 
adding a notarized signature page. (See Doc. No. 171-1 at 11-28.) To raise a genuine issue of 
material fact, the nonmoving party must set forth “specific facts” showing a genuine issue for 
trial because “there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the 
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; cf. 
Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d, 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that plaintiff’s conclusory 
allegation not based upon personal knowledge was insufficient to raise a fact issue). In his
11
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response, Plaintiff has presented no evidence to dispute that he was seen only once by Defendant 
Goldsmith. The only disputed fact is whether Defendant Goldsmith acknowledged that Plaintiff 
had a medical need for the medication he sought. Plaintiff has presented only his conclusory 
allegations, not sufficient evidence to refute Defendant Goldsmith’s evidence that Plaintiff’s 
treatment was based on an objective evaluation of Plaintiff’s medical needs. Plaintiff never sets 
forth any specific statement made by Defendant Goldsmith that would indicate Defendant 
Goldsmith felt Plaintiff needed pain medication. In fact, Plaintiff does not dispute and rather 
specifically concurs that Defendant Goldsmith refused to prescribe pain medication to Plaintiff 
on September 17, 2008. Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Goldsmith acknowledged a “need” for 
the medication is not a genuine issue in dispute, given the overwhelming, uncontroverted 
evidence that Defendant Goldsmith refused to provide pain medication to Plaintiff because 
Defendant felt there was no medical necessity. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. “The record does not 
even approach establishing a denial of adequate medical care, much less an issue relating to a 
culpable state of mind, i.e., a deliberate indifference . . . to . . . medical conditions.” Handy v. 
Price, 996 F.2d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir. 1993). For this reason, Plaintiff’s allegations do not form 
a basis for relief pursuant to § 1983.
To the extent Plaintiff’ s disagrees with the treatment provided, his disagreement does not 
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107 (disagreement 
regarding treatment is not sufficient to maintain a deliberate indifference cruel and unusual 
punishment claim). Whether a course of treatment is appropriate “is a classic example of a 
matter for medical judgment,” that is insufficient to sustain a claim under the Eighth
12
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Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107 (noting that medical decision to forego one form of 
treatment may be negligence but is not a constitutional violation). See also Perkins v. Kansas 
Dep’t Corrs., 165 F .3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] prisoner who merely disagrees with a 
diagnosis or a prescribed course of treatment does not state a constitutional violation.”); Olson v. 
Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[a] difference of opinion does not support a claim of 
cruel and unusual punishment”); Ledoux v. Davies, 961 F.2d 1536, 1537 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(“Plaintiff’s belief that he needed additional medication, other than that prescribed by the 
treating [medical provider] . . . is . . . insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”) 
(citations omitted). The medical evidence in the record contradicts Plaintiff’s conclusory 
allegations. As a layperson untrained in medicine, Plaintiff is not qualified to determine the 
proper course of treatment for his medical condition or to contradict the medical evidence in the 
record. See Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F.Supp.2d 281, 285 (D.N.H. 2003) (“Adequate medical care 
requires treatment by qualified medical personnel who provide services that are of a quality 
acceptable when measured by prudent professional standards in the community, tailored to an 
inmate’s particular medical needs, and that are based on medical considerations.”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff’s disagreement with his medical treatment does 
not form a basis for relief pursuant to § 1983.
Finally, temporary denials of medications cannot serve as the basis for a deliberate 
indifference claim. Lane v. Klinger, 25 F. App’x 781, 783-84 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding no 
Eighth Amendment claim where pain medication denied for three hours); Jackson v. Simmons,
13
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No. Civ. A. 99-3363-KHV, 2001 WL 951008, at *5 (D. Kan. July 26, 2001) (finding no Eighth 
Amendment claim where pain medication denied for one day).
Here, even the conclusory allegations raised by Plaintiff in his “affidavit” lack any 
supporting specific facts necessary to show that Defendant Goldsmith’s conduct rises to the level 
of an Eighth Amendment violation. Defendant Goldsmith is entitled to summary judgment on 
Plaintiff’s Eight Amendment violations.
b. Defendant Krebs
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Krebs deprived him of his Eighth Amendment rights because 
he “is the Head of Physician Health Partners (PHP). Dr. Kreibs [sic] is responsible for the day to 
day operations of PHP and the actions of PHP staff . . . .” It appears that Plaintiff attributes 
liability to Defendant Krebs merely based on his supervisory role. The state of mind required to 
establish a § 1983 claim based on supervisory liability is the state of mind requirement that is
tied to the underlying constitutional provision at issue. Iqbal,__ U.S.___ , 129 S. Ct. at 1948;
Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1204-1205. To establish a violation of § 1983 by a supervisor, the plaintiff 
must, at minimum, establish a deliberate and intentional act on the part of the defendant to 
violate the plaintiff's legal rights. Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (10th Cir. 2010).
It is undisputed that Defendant Krebs has never met or had any personal interaction with 
the plaintiff (see Doc. No. 149-2, ^ 6), and that Defendant Krebs’ only involvement with 
Plaintiff was to analyze referrals for treatment or tests and either to approve or deny the referrals 
(id., ^ 5). Plaintiff has stated no facts and has provided no evidence to support a conclusion that 
Defendant Krebs “promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the
14
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continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) 
acted with the [deliberate indifference] required to establish the alleged [Eighth Amendment] 
deprivation.” Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199-1200.
As Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on this matter, Defendant 
Krebs is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims. Concrete 
Works, Inc., 36 F.3d at 1518.
c. Defendant Webster
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Webster violated his Eighth Amendment rights by “alter[ing] 
[his] longstanding migrain[e] diagnosis to cluster headaches . . . .” (Compl. at 18, ^ 1.) Plaintiff 
alleges that, due to this “misdiagnosis,” Defendant Webster began giving him trigger point 
injections. (Id.)
In his Affidavit, Defendant Webster states that he saw Plaintiff on numerous occasions 
regarding Plaintiff’s alleged degenerative disc disease and migraine headaches, including on 
May, 07, 2008, May 15, 2008, July 01, 2008, July 2, 2008, August 22, 2008, October 3, 2008, 
October, 08, 2008, October 28, 2008, December 02, 2008, January 22, 2009, April 07, 2009 and 
April 17, 2009. (Doc. No. 149-3, ^6.) The medical records provided with Defendant Webster’s 
affidavit show that Defendant Webster treated Plaintiff for headaches and migraine headaches. 
(See id. at 7-22.) On May 7, 2008, May 15, 2008, and August 22, 2008, Defendant Webster 
obtained informed consent to administer trigger point injections to Plaintiff. (Id., ^ 7, 8, 11; see 
id. at 7-8, 11.) On May 7, 2008, Plaintiff related that “his head felt much better within minutes” 
of the injection. (Id. at 7.) On May 15, 2008, Plaintiff stated that the trigger point injections
15
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were helpful for several days, but that the headaches returned. (Id. at 8.) On July 2, 2008, 
Plaintiff advised Defendant Webster that the trigger point injection did help his headaches. (Id. 
at 10.) On August 22, 2008, Plaintiff advised Defendant Webster that the trigger point injections 
helped and requested “more TPI’s today.” (Id. at 11.) After injection, Plaintiff “experienced 
very good relief.” (Id.) The records also reflect that, in response to kites and requests made by 
Plaintiff, on July 1, 2008, October 28, 2008, December 2, 2008, January 22, 2009, April 7, 2009, 
and April 17, 2009, Defendant Webster provided Plaintiff with prescriptions he requested for his 
headaches (see id. at 11, 15, 16) or made Non-Formulary Drug Requests on Plaintiff’s behalf 
(see id. at 9, 14, 17-18, 19-22).
Though Plaintiff alleges Defendant Webster changed his diagnosis from migraine 
headaches to cluster headaches, the evidence provided by the parties directly contradict this 
allegation. The records provided are devoid of any reference to a diagnosis of “cluster 
headaches” and, in fact, the records from Plaintiff’s visits from May 7, 2008, August 22, 2008, 
October 3, 2008, October 8, 2008, October 28, 2008, April 7, 2009, and April 17, 2009, indicate 
Plaintiff was being treated by Defendant Webster for migraine—not cluster—headaches. (Doc. 
No. 149-3 at 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 21 and 22.) Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Webster changed 
his diagnosis to cluster headaches is not a genuine issue in dispute, given the overwhelming, 
uncontroverted evidence of Defendant Webster’s continual treatment of Plaintiff’s diagnosed 
migraine headaches. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. Further, as noted, whether the diagnosis was 
changed or not is immaterial to the claim because it is clear Defendant Webster was treating 
Plaintiff for his headaches.
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It is undisputed that Plaintiff was given trigger point injections for his headaches.
Plaintiff alleges the “improper administration” of the trigger point injections caused him long- 
lasting pain. (Compl. at 18, ^ 1.) While it is undisputed, and the records show, that Plaintiff was 
seen many times for headaches, Plaintiff has failed to offer “specific facts [ ] sufficient to raise a 
‘genuine issue of material fact’ ” that Defendant Webster improperly administered the trigger 
point injections or that any pain was related to the improper administration of the injections. See 
BancOklahomaMort. Corp., 194 F.3d at 1097 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48). Without 
citation to the record, Plaintiff’s assertions are merely conclusory and cannot serve to create a 
genuine issue of fact to survive summary judgment. L & MEnters. v. BEISensors & Sys. Co., 
231 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting conclusory allegations without citation to the 
record are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact to defeat summary judgment.). Thus, 
even examining the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, see BancOklahoma Mort. 
Corp., 194 F.3d at 1098, the record does not support Plaintiff’s position. Moreover, to the extent 
Plaintiff’s disagrees with the treatment provided, his disagreement does not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107
Plaintiff also alleges on July 2, 2008, Defendant Webster “refused to give [him] treatment 
telling [him] all [his] problems were because [he] was fat.” (Id.) The record of Plaintiff’s 
examination on July 2, 2008, notes an Assessment of “Morbid Obesity.” (Doc. No. 149-3 at 10.) 
Defendant Webster states that on August 22, 2008, he “discussed Plaintiff’s obesity (BMI 29) 
and the benefit of low back exercises and a walking program.” (Id., Doc. No. 149-3, ^ 11; at 11.) 
The records from these dates contradict Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Webster refused to
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treat him because of his obesity. In fact, despite the reference to Plaintiff’s morbid obesity, on 
July 1, 2008, Defendant Webster, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, submitted a Non-Formulary 
Drug Request for “Topamax to help prevent [Plaintiff’s] headaches.” (Id. at 9, 22.) The Drug 
Request was approved on July 17, 2008. (Id. at 22.) On August 22, 2008, again despite a 
discussion about Plaintiff’s obesity, Defendant Webster, at Plaintiff’s request, provided trigger 
point injections, and Plaintiff experienced good relief. (Id. at 11.) The court finds there is not a 
genuine issue in dispute regarding whether Defendant Webster failed provide treatment to 
Plaintiff because of his obesity, given the uncontroverted evidence provided by Defendant 
Webster. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
Plaintiff has failed to establish any genuine dispute of material fact pertinent to whether 
Defendant Webster was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. As such, 
Defendant Webster is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims.
d. Defendant Singh
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Singh violated his Eighth Amendment rights by, from 
December 15, 2006, to February 11, 2007, failing to treat Plaintiff after a seizure and telling 
Plaintiff “there was nothing wrong with my diffuse degenerative disc disease and migraine 
disorder.” (Compl. at 21, ^ 5.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Singh refused to provide medical 
care and gave him medication to which he has an allergy. (Id.)
In his Affidavit, Defendant Singh states he evaluated Plaintiff on May 21, 2007, May 31, 
2007, and August 30, 2007. (Doc. 149-4, ^ 6.) The records reflect Plaintiff was seen by Mr. 
Singh for back pain and migraine headaches. (See id. at 4-6.) Defendant Singh avers he
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prescribed appropriate medication and an exercise regimen and counseled Plaintiff to lose 
weight. (Id., ^ 6; at 4.) On May 21, 2007, Defendant Singh prescribed Nortriptyline to Plaintiff 
for thirty days. (Id., ^ 7; at 4.) On May 31, 2007, Plaintiff reported that he had an allergic 
reaction to Nortriptyline and broke out in a rash. (Id.^ 7; at 5.) Defendant Singh observed no 
signs of distress. (Id. at 5.) Defendant Singh also states that Nortriptyline is a Med-line 
medication, and according to the Electronic Medication record for the entire thirty days, Plaintiff 
did not take a single dose of Nortriptyline. (Id., ^ 7.)
It is disputed whether Defendant Singh treated Plaintiff from December 15, 2006, 
through February 11, 2007. The records provided by Defendant Singh show he provided 
Plaintiff with medication and treatment for his back pain and headaches on May 21, 2007, May 
31, 2007, and August 30, 2007. On the other hand, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence 
showing that Defendant Singh refused to treat Plaintiff during the time period December 15, 
2006, through February 11, 2007. Finally, though there is no dispute that Defendant Singh 
prescribed Nortriptyline to Plaintiff, the records are devoid of any evidence of an allergic 
reaction to the medication. The evidence presented by Defendant Singh shifted the burden to 
Plaintiff to present specific facts in dispute. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Weisman, 27 
F.3d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1994). The generalized allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint and 
affidavit are not responsive to the factual evidence provided by the defendant. Weisman, 27 F.3d 
at 503 (citations omitted). Without specific facts supporting his claims, Plaintiff’s bare 
assertions are insufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial.
19
Case 1:09-cv-01051-REB-KMT Document 194 Filed 04/22/11 USDC Colorado Page 20 of 46
Moreover, even if this court could conclude that Plaintiff has raised fact issues regarding 
Defendant Singh’s allegedly prescribing a medication to which Plaintiff is allergic, the issue 
raised is immaterial. Whether or not Plaintiff was given a medication to which he had an allergy 
is immaterial because it would not, as Plaintiff suggests, necessarily compel the conclusion 
Defendant Singh gave the prescription with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical 
needs. The record from the date Defendant Singh prescribed the medication to Plaintiff shows 
allergies to Depakote, Dilantin, Inderal, Midrin, and Tegretol. (Doc. No. 149-4 at 4.) Plaintiff 
has produced no evidence showing that he ever informed Defendant Singh or any other CDOC 
medical provider that he was allergic Nortriptyline. Thus, there is no showing that Defendant 
Singh was aware of Plaintiff’ s alleged allergy, which precludes inferring deliberate indifference 
from Defendant Singh’s prescription of the medication. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38.
Accordingly, Defendant Singh is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth 
Amendment claims.
e. Defendant Fortunato
Plaintiff claims on September 11, 2008, Defendant Fortunato refused to conduct an 
examination and told Plaintiff Imitrex was too expensive and that Plaintiff would never get it. 
(Compl. at 20, ^ 4.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Fortunato demonstrated deliberate indifference 
by choosing a less effective means of care. (Id.)
Defendant Fortunato, in his Affidavit, states he evaluated Plaintiff on September 11, 
2008. (Doc. No. 149-5, ^ 6.) The purpose of the appointment was to discuss a medication 
change from Zomig to Imitrex and to discuss Hepatitis vaccinations. (Id., ^ 8; at 5.) The
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medical record for that visit reflects that Plaintiff stated he was allergic to Zomig. (Id. at 5.) 
Defendant Fortunato explained to Plaintiff that his records going back to 2007 contained no 
information regarding an allergy to Zomig. (Id.) Defendant Fortunato also noted that Plaintiff’s 
records “induicate [sic] abuse of medications [t]o include Darvocet and Imitrex.” (Id.)
Defendant Fortunato states the record does not reflect any discussion about the cost of either 
medication, that no such discussion took place, and that he is unaware of the cost of either drug. 
(Id., 1 9.)
There is a dispute about whether a conversation regarding the cost of the medication took 
place and whether the decision to treat Plaintiff was based on the cost of the medication. 
Nevertheless, assuming a resolution of the dispute in Plaintiff’s favor that such a conversation 
did take place, a prisoner is not constitutionally entitled to unlimited medical care without regard 
to cost. See Taylor v. Barnett, 105 F. Supp.2d 483, 489 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“While inmates are 
entitled to adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment, they are not entitled to the best 
and most expensive form of treatment.” (citation omitted)). Cost is a legitimate consideration, 
see Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006), and the constitution permits 
officials to decline certain kinds of expensive treatment so long as they provide adequate medical 
care. See Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 1987) (“the local government’s 
interest in limiting the cost of detention justifies providing no more than a reasonable level of 
medical care”); Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The state’s 
interest in limiting the cost of detention . . . ordinarily will justify the state’s decision to provide 
detainees with a reasonable level of . . . medical care.”). Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts or
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provide any evidence that the treatment he received with the allegedly less-expensive medication 
was unreasonable or inadequate. Therefore, the recognized dispute of fact in this case is 
immaterial.
Plaintiff’s allegations that he was not examined by Defendant Fortunato on September 
11, 2008, and that he was given allegedly less-expensive medication are contradicted by the 
evidence. The medical record from that date shows that Defendant Fortunato conducted an 
evaluation of Plaintiff, took his vital signs, discussed Plaintiff’s wish to be vaccinated for 
Hepatitis A and B prophylactically, and discussed Plaintiff’ s wish to receive Imitrex rather than 
Zomig. (Doc. No. 149-5 at 5.) The records also show that Defendant Fortunato chose Zomig, 
rather than Imitrex, because of Plaintiff’s history of abuse of Imitrex. (Id.) The evidence 
provided by Defendant Fortunato shifted the burden to Plaintiff to present specific facts in 
dispute. See Weisman, 27 F.3d at 503. Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. Thus, Plaintiff’s 
allegations are not genuine issues in dispute, given the uncontroverted evidence provided by 
Defendant Fortunato. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
Further, even if this court could conclude that Plaintiff has raised fact issues regarding 
Defendant Fortunato’s allegedly prescribing a less-expensive medication to which Plaintiff is 
allergic, the issue raised is immaterial because it does necessarily compel the conclusion 
Defendant Fortunato gave the prescription with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious 
medical needs, especially in light of the evidence that Defendant Fortunato prescribed Zomig 
because of Plaintiff’s history of past abuse of Imitrex. (See Doc. No. 149-5 at 5.)
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As such, summary judgment should be entered in favor of Defendant Fortunato on 
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims.
f. Defendant Stock
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Stock has been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical 
needs “on multiple occasions,” including on August 4, 2008, when she refused Plaintiff’s 
attempt to get proper medication. (Compl. at 21, ^ 4.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Stock said he 
had “drug seeking behavior.” (Id.) Plaintiff also contends that Defendant Stock prescribed a 
medication to be given four times per day, knowing that SCF distributes medication only two 
times per day. (Id.)
In her Affidavit, Defendant Stock states she has seen Plaintiff for treatment on multiple 
occasions, including March 26, 2008, April 16, 2008, May 13, 2008, June 9, 2008, and August 4, 
2008. (See Doc. No. 149-6.) On March 26, 2008, Defendant Stock evaluated Plaintiff for “an 
increase in Topamax” for high stress and recurrent headaches.” (Id. at 6.) Defendant Stock 
submitted a Non-Formulary Drug Request on that day for an increase of Plaintiff’s Topamax 
medication. (Id. at 7.) On April 16, 2008, Defendant Stock saw Plaintiff for back pain. (Id. at 
8.) Plaintiff stated that he cannot take Motrin or Naprosyn as they upset his stomach. (Id.) At 
that time, Defendant Stock prescribed medication called Robaxin, which is a muscle relaxer.
(Id., ^ 7; at 8.) Plaintiff stated he had allergies to Depakote, Dilantin, Midrin, Propanolol and 
Tegretol, which are all common seizure medications. (Id., ^ 7; at 8.)
On May 13, 2008, Defendant Stock saw Plaintiff when he complained of “irrectractable 
migraine headache.” (Id. at 9.) The physical exam showed no sign of photophobia, which is
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common for migraine headaches. (Id., ^8; at 9.) Plaintiff stated that he cannot take NSAIDs due 
to allergies. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff requested a shot of Nubain, which Defendant Stock informed 
him the medical department did not have. (Id.) Defendant Stock agreed to try Darvocet, 
agreeing to limit the medication to only three days per month. (Id.) On June 9, 2008, Defendant 
Stock was informed that Plaintiff was using Darvocet four times a day, every day, and not 
limited to their prior agreement of approximately three pills of Darvocet per month. (Id., ^ 9; at 
10.) Defendant Stock noted Plaintiff was abusing the medication and discontinued it. (Id.)
On August 4, 2008, Defendant Stock saw Plaintiff when he was again asking for narcotic 
pain relief. (Id., ^10; at 11.) Plaintiff stated an “incredibly painful headache.” (Id. at 11.) 
However Plaintiff’s vital signs were normal, and Defendant Stock observed no pain symptoms. 
(Id.) Defendant Stock suggested nonnarcotic medications at that visit, but Plaintiff would not 
discuss anything but narcotic pain relievers. (Id.) Defendant Stock tried to explain that the 
Department of Corrections does not use narcotics except under extreme circumstances. (Id., ^ 
10.) Defendant Stock asked Plaintiff to leave the exam room “since he doesn’t want to talk 
about anything except narcotic pain relief.” (Id. at 11.) Defendant Stock noted that she felt 
“strongly that this is drug-seeking behaviour [sic] at its best.” (Id.)
There are no disputes that Defendant Stock saw Plaintiff on August 4, 2008, that 
Defendant Stock refused to give Plaintiff any additional narcotics, and that she believed Plaintiff 
was exhibiting drug-seeking behavior. The only dispute concerns Plaintiff’s conclusion that on 
August 4, 2008, Defendant Stock “refused Plaintiff’s attempt to get proper medication.” (See 
Compl. at 21, ^ 4.) As noted supra, a disagreement over a course of treatment does not amount
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to a constitutional violation. Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575; Perkins, 165 F.3d at 811. To the extent 
Plaintiff believes a different medication would have been more effective for him, this 
disagreement over the best course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference. See 
Perkins, 165 F.3d at 811. Case law firmly establishes that prisoners do not have the right to 
receive any and all medical treatments that they choose. Estelle, 429 U .S. at 106.
There is no dispute that Defendant Stock refused to provide Plaintiff with the medication 
he sought because of what she believed was drug-seeking behavior. The evidence provided by 
Defendant Stock shows that Defendant Stock was concerned about Plaintiff’s past history of 
drug abuse and overuse. The records also reflect that Plaintiff was offered alternative 
medications but refused because he insisted on obtaining a narcotic. On the other hand, Plaintiff 
has provided no evidence of Defendant Stock’s subjective desire to cause harm to Plaintiff by 
her refusal to continue providing Darvocet or another narcotic.
Given the uncontroverted evidence, Plaintiff’s conclusory claim that Defendant Stock 
was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs for her refusal to provide “proper medication” 
is not sufficient to meet his burden to prove that Defendant Stock violated his Eighth 
Amendment rights. Based on this record, no issue of disputed fact exists material to Plaintiff’s 
Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his medical conditions, and Defendant 
Stock is entitled to summary judgment.
f. Defendant White
The only allegation made by Plaintiff against Defendant White is that she, on April 1, 
2009, refused to provide him with his prescribed medication. (Compl. at 22, ^ 7.) This
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allegation is undisputed. However, Plaintiff still has failed to show that there is a genuine 
dispute as to any material fact pertinent to the an Eighth Amendment claim based on alleged 
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Defendant White, in her Affidavit, states that on April 1, 2009, Plaintiff went to the 
medical clinic complaining of a migraine headache. (Doc. No. 149-7, ^ 6.) According to 
Defendant White, no officer had called to ask if Plaintiff could go to the medical clinic to get 
medication, and therefore Plaintiff was informed that he needed to go back to his unit and have 
an officer call the medical clinic. (Id.) Defendant White states that Plaintiff returned to his unit, 
but the officer did not call the medical clinic to request that Plaintiff be seen. (Id.)
In Plaintiff’s grievance related to this matter, Plaintiff concedes that he was sent back to 
his unit after being taken to the medical unit without a phone call. (Doc. No. 170 at 65.) In 
response, Defendant White advised Plaintiff that he needed to follow the proper procedure and 
have his commanding officer contact the medical until to notify them of his problem so the 
medical unit could “check to see what med you need, & how often you get it. When you just 
drop in to medical and expect immediate tx, you will be sent back to your unit.” (Id.)
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence showing any deliberate indifference 
by Defendant White. Plaintiff has failed to allege facts or provide evidence that Defendant 
White “kn[ew] of and disregarded] an excessive risk to [Plaintiff’s] health and safety.” Farmer, 
511 U.S. at 837. There is no evidence that Defendant White was aware of Plaintiff’s medical 
history, of the medications Plaintiff was able to take, or the reason for the prescription. 
Moreover, the evidence shows that Defendant’s refusal to provide the medication when he
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showed up the medical clinic without following policy was based on her need to obtain that 
information prior to seeing the plaintiff. There is no evidence of any subjective motive to cause 
harm to Plaintiff.
Accordingly, because there is no genuine dispute of any material fact, summary judgment 
should be entered in favor of Defendant White on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims.
g. Defendant Johnson
Finally, Plaintiff’s only allegation against Defendant Regina Johnson is that she was 
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs “by twice refusing to allow [him] to get [his] 
medication.” (Compl. at 21-22, 1 6.) In her Affidavit, Defendant Johnson explains that as a 
Medical Officer-Correctional Officer 1, her duties were to make sure inmates had a valid pass 
for the clinic and to sign them in and to ensure the safety of the nurses and other medical 
providers. (Doc. No. 149-8, 11 5-6.) Defendant Johnson states she does not provide medical 
services to the inmates and does not have authority or ability to deny an inmate his medication. 
(Id., 1 7.)
The Tenth Circuit has stated:
Ordinarily, a medical professional will not be liable for this second kind of 
deliberate indifference, because he is the person who provides the treatment. If, 
however, the medical professional knows that his role in a particular medical 
emergency is solely to serve as a gatekeeper for other medical personnel capable 
of treating the condition, and if he delays or refuses to fulfill that gatekeeper role 
due to deliberate indifference, it stands to reason that he also may be liable for 
deliberate indifference from denying access to medical care.
Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir. 2000). Given the evidence provided by
Defendant Johnson, and in light of Plaintiff’s pure conclusory allegation, the burden shifted to
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Plaintiff to provide factual support for his allegations. Weisman, 27 F.3d 500, 503. The 
undisputed evidence shows that Defendant Johnson is not a medical provider and, as such, is not 
liable for a failure to provide medical treatment. Sealock, 218 F. 3d at 1211. Moreover, to the 
extent Defendant Johnson may be liable in her capacity as a gatekeeper, Plaintiff’s Complaint 
and his response are devoid of any factual allegations, and Plaintiff has not provided any 
evidence, regarding how Defendant Johnson may have “delay[ed] or refuse[d] to fulfill [her] 
gatekeeper role,” see id., or how Defendant Johnson “prevented” him from obtaining medication.
The record simply does not demonstrate any evidence that Defendant Johnson acted with 
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs. That is, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged 
that Defendant Johnson knew of and disregarded “an excessive risk to [Plaintiff’ s] health and 
safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Accordingly, giving the plaintiff the benefit of all the 
favorable inferences to which he is entitled from the evidence in the record, which the court must 
do on summary judgment, the court concludes that summary judgment must be granted in favor 
of Defendant Johnson on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims.
2. First Amendment Retaliation Claims 
Plaintiff alleges he has “been subjected to retaliation when [he] has excercised [sic] [his] 
rights, [his] protected right to seek medical attention and petition the goverment [sic] for redress 
of grievances.” (Compl. at 11.) Plaintiff states he has filed grievances with the CDOC, the State 
Board of Medical Examiners, and the State Board of Dental Examiners. (Id.)
A plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim against the government for exercising his First 
Amendment rights must prove the following elements:
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(1) that the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the 
defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a 
person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) 
that the defendant’s adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to 
the plaintiff’ s exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.
Shero v. City o f Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Worrell v. Henry,
219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000)). To establish a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must show
that “but for the retaliatory motive, the incidents to which he refers . . . would not have taken
place.” Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 949-50 (10th Cir. 1990) (quotations omitted).
Defendants argue that they should be granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation
claims for the defendants’ lack of personal participation. (Doc. No. 150 at 9-21.) A defendant
cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he or she caused or personally participated in the
alleged constitutional violation. Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996). A
respondeat superior theory of liability cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim. McKee v.
Heggy, 703 F.2d 479, 483 (10th Cir. 1983).
a. Defendants Involved in Removal from Population and 
Disciplinary Convictions
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wingert approved his Removal from Population (RFP) 
“for exersice [sic] of [his] protected right to seek medical attention and address issues of public 
concern. RFP is an adverse action resulting from [his] excercise [sic] of [his] protected rights.” 
(Compl. at 25, ^ 17.) In her Affidavit, Defendant Wingert states that at the time of the alleged 
incident, she was Shift Commander for the SC., and she was providing command and 
supervisory authority with decision making-authority and responsibility to ensure normal
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operations. (Doc. No. 150-8, ^ 5.) Defendant Wingert avers on October 9, 2009, she was 
informed by Defendants St. Martin and Johnson of an incident involving Plaintiff. (Id., ^ 6.) 
Following the incident, Plaintiff was transported to Defendant Wingert’s office, where she 
counseled Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff then was removed from the general prison population. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Major Johnson “approved [his] RFP for excersise [sic] of 
[his] right to seek medical attention and address issues of public concern. RFP is an adverse 
action resulting from [his] excercise [sic] of [his] protected rights.” (Compl. at 25-26, ^ 19.) 
Defendant Johnson avers on October 29, 2008, he was working as the East Custody/Control 
Manager, and that his knowledge of the incident alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint was limited to 
reviewing the incident the following morning as part of his daily routine. (Doc. No. 150-8, ^ 7.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Bolt “was responsible for investigating and approving the 
COPD charges resulting from the above mentioned incidents” and that he “participated in the 
adverse action resulting from [his] exercising [his] protected right.” (Compl. at 28, ^  22-23.) 
Defendant Bolt states he was Reviewing Supervisor for Plaintiff’s case, arising out of the 
incident occurring on October 29, 2008. (Doc. No. 150-4, ^ 5.) Defendant Bolt’s duties were to 
investigate a possible violation of the Code of Penal Discipline (COPD), including an 
investigation of the reports written and speaking with staff and offenders involved to determine 
whether there was a possible violation. (Id.) During the course of the investigation into the 
incident involving Plaintiff, Defendant Bolt found that Plaintiff had violated Class II, Rule 16, 
and forwarded a charge under the COPD. (Id., ^ 6.)
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Plaintiff alleges Defendant McMahill “was responsible for investigating and approving 
the COPD charges” at a hearing on November 13, 2008. (Compl. at 28, ^ 24.) Plaintiff alleges 
Defendant McMahill “was responsible for prosecuting the COPD charges resulting from the 
above mentioned incidents” and that he “participated in the adverse action which resulted from 
[his] exercising [his] protected rights.” Defendant McMahill states he was the Disciplinary 
Officer who presented the CDOC’s case against Plaintiff on November 18, 2008. (Doc. No. 
150-5, ^ 5.) Defendant McMahill was given a notice of charge written by Defendant St. Martin, 
which showed Plaintiff “advocating in west medical.” (Id., ^ 6.) Defendant McMahill used the 
Notice of Charge as evidence to present the CDOC’s case. (Id.) Defendant McMahill’s states 
his only knowledge of the case is what was contained within the Notice of Charge. (Id.) 
Defendant McMahill presented that Plaintiff did cause a disruption in medical and first 
responders had to be called due to Plaintiff’s actions. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Zwirn “was responsible for hearing the COPD charges” and 
“in finding [him] guilty.” Defendant Zwirn states that he on November 18, 2008, he was the 
hearings officer for Plaintiff’s rule infractions for Class II 16, advocating or creating a facility 
disruption, and Class II 19, unauthorized possession. (Doc. No. 150-6, ^ 6.) Defendant Zwirn 
states, “Plaintiff was found guilty of advocating as he was being disruptive in medical and 
required additional staff to be pulled from their normal duties to deal with his disruptive action.” 
(Id.) Plaintiff also was found guilty of unauthorized possession for having three books that did 
not belong to him and an unauthorized legal box. (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that after he complained to Defendant St. Martin that the medical 
accommodations at the prison facility do not allow for prompt emergency treatment, Defendant 
St. Martin “had [him] removed from population and gave [him] a Code of Penal Discipline 
Report [COPD].” (Compl. at 25, ^ 14.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant St. Martin 
fabricated the incident report and that but for Plaintiff exercising his protected rights, he would 
not have suffered removal and COPD write-ups, which he states are adverse actions. (Id.) 
Defendant St. Martin states that on October 29, 2008, he was working in the west medical unit as 
Hub Hall Officer, conducting escorts from west medical to the east side. (Doc. No. 150-1, ^  5.) 
Upon his arrival to west medical, Defendant St. Martin was informed by Defendant Regina 
Johnson that Plaintiff was advocating and refusing to leave west medical as ordered. (Id., ^ 6.) 
Once Defendant St. Martin opened the holding cell to release the east side prisoners, Plaintiff 
began to raise his voice and engage in an argument with Defendant Johnson regarding 
medication he requested from the doctor. (Id., ^ 7.) Defendant St. Martin avers that Plaintiff 
was noncompliant and demanded to see the shift commander. (Id.) Plaintiff threw his pass on 
the ground and proceeded to yell at Defendant Johnson, stating that he would not leave until he 
was seen by the shift commander. (Id.) Defendant St. Martin gave Plaintiff two loud verbal 
commands to turn around and cuff up. (Id., ^ 8.) Plaintiff took approximately two steps toward 
Defendant Johnson and other inmates in the hallway while yelling at Defendant Johnson, who 
had her back to Plaintiff at that time. (Id.) Defendant St. Martin attempted to place Plaintiff in 
handcuffs, at which point he resisted and began to pull away from Defendant St. Martin. (Id.) 
Defendant St. Martin attempted to place Plaintiff into the nearest wall, but Plaintiff was
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passively resisting by going limp to the ground. (Id.) Defendant Johnson called for first 
responders to west medical and Plaintiff was placed into handcuffs. (Id.)
It is well settled that prisoners’ filing of grievances is activity protected by the First 
Amendment. See Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1405 (10th Cir. 1996). However, Plaintiff 
has failed to allege or to provide any factual evidence that the defendants’ actions caused him to 
suffer an injury that chilled him from continuing to file grievances in the future. See Shero, 510 
F.3d at 1203. To the contrary, the hundreds of pages of exhibits provided by Plaintiff with his 
response show that Plaintiff has continued to file an inordinate number of grievances and has 
continued to file complaints with the CDOC, the State Board of Medical Examiners, and the 
State Board of Dental Examiners, as well as lawsuits in this Court. (See Doc. Nos. 170 and 171.) 
Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence regarding any injury or adverse consequences 
caused by the COPD convictions or by being removed from the general prison population.
Finally, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that the defendants’ adverse actions 
were substantially motivated as a response to Plaintiff’s filing of grievances. The Tenth Circuit 
has recognized that, in retaliation claims, the presentation of circumstantial evidence such as 
temporal proximity, a chronology of events, or suspicious timing may be sufficient to support 
allegations of retaliation. See Maschner, 899 F.2d at 949 (holding that the inmate sufficiently 
supported retaliation claim with “only means available to him-circumstantial evidence of the 
suspicious timing of his discipline, coincidental transfers of his witnesses and assistants”). 
However, here Plaintiff does not provide any chronology of events or any direct or 
circumstantial evidence from which the court could plausibly conclude that retaliation for
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protected activities occurred. The only allegations are that in response to Plaintiff’s disruption in 
the west medical unit, certain of the defendants took action with which Plaintiff apparently 
disagrees. Indeed, Plaintiff offers no more than his bare assertions that Defendants were 
motivated to retaliate against him for his filing of grievances. Plaintiff has provided no more than 
“his personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325 
(5th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff’s bare, conclusory assertions are insufficient to raise a fact issue. See 
Callahan, 471 F.3d at 1160.
Moreover, even viewing Plaintiff’s allegations in the light most favorable to him, they do 
not establish that the defendants had a retaliatory motive. See Dawson v. Johnson, 266 F. App’x. 
713, 716 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding allegations that defendants presided over disciplinary hearing, 
investigated charge, presented facts in support of charge at disciplinary hearing, and affirming 
conviction insufficient to establish motive or personal participation in retaliation claim). The 
undisputed evidence shows that Defendant Wingert’s only involvement was that she counseled 
Plaintiff before he was removed from the general population; Defendant Major Johnson’s only 
involvement was reviewing the October 29, 2008, incident report the morning after the incident 
occurred as part of his daily routine; Defendant Bolt’s only involvement was that he investigated 
Plaintiff’s possible violation of the COPD and forwarded the COPD charge; Defendant 
McMahill’s only involvement was that he investigated the possible COPD violation and 
presented facts in support of the charge at the hearing; and Defendant Zwirn’s only involvement 
was that he attempted to restrain Plaintiff during the October 29, 2008, incident.
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Accordingly, Defendants Wingert, Major Johnson, Bolt, McMahill, and St. Martin are 
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.
b. Defendant Webster
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Webster retaliated against Plaintiff by refusing to see him and 
talking to Defendant “Weingardt [sic] on the phone and recommending the RFP for [his] 
excersise [sic] of [his] right to seek medical attention and address issues of public concern 
because Plaintiff filed a complaint against Mr. Webster with the Colorado State Board of 
Medical Examiners.” (Compl. at 26, ^ 19.) Again, Plaintiff has failed to allege or to provide any 
evidence that Defendant Webster’s alleged actions caused him to suffer an injury that chilled 
him from continuing to file grievances in the future. See Shero, 510 F.3d at 1203. Plaintiff also 
has failed to provide any evidence that the defendants’ adverse actions were substantially 
motivated as a response to Plaintiff’s filing of grievances. See id. Plaintiff’s conclusory 
allegations are insufficient to raise a fact issue. See Callahan, 471 F.3d at 1160. Defendant 
Webster is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
c. Defendant Lefever
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lefever “used [Plaintiff’s] RFP for [his] seeking medical 
attention as an excuse to confiscate [his] property,” and that Defendant Lefever destroyed some 
important legal papers. (Compl. at 27, ^ 21.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Lefever 
retaliated against him by not allowing him to log out legal mail. (Id.) Defendant Lefever does 
not dispute that on October 29, 2008, when Plaintiff “was to be packed out for transport,” 
Defendant Lefever and Sergeant Oliverus went to Plaintiff’s cell to do the pack out. (Doc. No.
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150-2, ^ 6.) Plaintiff had three books over the eight book limit and a file box not on his property 
sheet. (Id.) Plaintiff also had nine new hygiene items, even though Plaintiff had not purchased 
items from the canteen since April 17, 2007. (Id.) The books and the hygiene items were given 
to the shift leader, and a report was written on the unauthorized property. (Id.) Approximately 
two cubic feet of loose papers, which were over the limit, were disposed of as nuisance trash. 
(Id.) Defendant Lefever’s states his job duties do not involve whether mail is logged out as legal 
or non-legal, as that is a function of the mail room. (Id., ^ 7.)
It appears Plaintiff is asserting that Defendant Lefever violated his First Amendment 
right of access to the courts, which is a fundamental constitutional right. Bounds v. Smith, 430 
U.S. 817, 828 (1977). In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), the Supreme Court held that, to 
succeed on a claim of denial of access to the courts by restricting access to legal materials, an 
inmate must establish “actual injury,” i.e., that “his efforts to pursue a legal claim” were 
“hindered” by the defendant’s misconduct. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Plaintiff has failed to allege 
any facts or to provide any evidence that Defendant Lefever’s actions in removing legal papers 
and other personal items hindered his efforts to pursue his legal claims. Plaintiff also has failed 
to provide any evidence that the defendants’ adverse actions were substantially motivated as a 
response to Plaintiff’s filing of grievances. See id. Thus, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim 
against Defendant Lefever must fail.
d. Defendant Ball
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ball terminated Plaintiff from his position in the laundry 
as a retaliatory act for his complaining that the laundry was not hiring enough people and for
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going to the law library for legal access and for his medical issues. (Compl. at 30, ^ 30.) 
Defendant Ball avers that on October 9, 2009, she noticed Plaintiff was not wearing a white 
t-shirt under his green shirt. (Doc. No. 150-7, ^ 6.) Defendant Ball asked Plaintiff where his t- 
shirt was, and he replied that he did not wear one in to the laundry and that it was in the unit, and 
his work t-shirt was being washed. (Id.) According to Defendant Ball, Plaintiff violated 
“laundry procedure.” (Id., ^  7-8.) It is unclear from Defendant Ball’s Affidavit whether 
Plaintiff was terminated from his laundry job because of the alleged violation of laundry 
procedure. Regardless, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts or provide any evidence to 
demonstrate that Defendant Ball caused or participated in the alleged violation of his First 
Amendment rights. Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant Ball’s alleged conduct has 
prevented him from filing additional grievances. See Shero, 510 F.3d at 1203. Moreover, 
Plaintiff has failed to “prove that but for the retaliatory motive, the incident[] to which he refers 
. . . would not have taken place.” Maschner, 899 F.2d 949-50. As such, Defendant Ball is 
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
e. Defendant Jimerson
Though Plaintiff complains that Defendant Ball fired him from his position in laundry, 
Plaintiff also complains that “he has been forced to work in this laundry environment,” where 
Defendant Jimerson was reluctant to release him to go to the library for research of for a new 
job. (Compl. at 31, ^ 32.) Plaintiff further alleges that when he complained to Defendant 
Jimerson about the laundry job causing him “great harm to [his] health, to [his] back disease, and 
being forced when [he had] headaches . . . to work around loud machinery . . . she would get
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angry and refuse to call medical.” Defendant Jimerson explains that, as Laundry 
Lieutenant/Supervisor, her specific duties were to supervise offender work crew and three 
laundry sergeants. (Doc. No. 150-9, ^  4-5.) Approximately two times per week when Plaintiff 
had a scheduled appointment, he was allowed to go to the law library in lieu of going to work. 
(Id., ^ 6.) Defendant Jimerson states that the laundry staff did not deny Plaintiff access to the 
law library. (Id.) Defendant Jimerson also states that Plaintiff was informed of the working 
environment in the laundry when he interviewed for the position in December 2008 and that he 
did not indicate a medical condition at that time. (Id., ^ 7.) Defendant Jimerson avers that when 
Plaintiff was ill and could not perform his job duties, he was excused from work. (Id., 8.) Once 
again, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts or provide any evidence to demonstrate that 
Defendant Jimerson caused or participated in the alleged violation of his First Amendment 
rights. Plaintiff has failed to allege or to produce evidence that Defendant Jimerson’s alleged 
conduct has prevented him from filing additional grievances. See Shero, 510 F.3d at 1203. 
Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that Defendant Jimerson was aware of any 
grievances filed by Plaintiff or to “prove that but for the retaliatory motive, the incident[] to 
which he refers . . . would not have taken place.” Maschner, 899 F.2d 949-50. Defendant 
Jimerson is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
3. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that, to the extent Plaintiff is suing the defendants in their individual 
capacities under § 1983, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s Eighth
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Amendment and First Amendment claims. Whether the defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity is a legal question. Wilder v. Turner, 490 F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 2007).
Resolution of a dispositive motion based on qualified immunity involves a 
two-pronged inquiry. First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff 
has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right. Second, . . . 
the court must decide whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time 
of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. With regard to this second [prong], the 
relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established 
is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful 
under the circumstances presented.
Herrera v. City o f Albuquerque, 589 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). “A reviewing court may exercise [its] sound discretion in deciding which 
of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the 
circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. “Qualified immunity is applicable unless” the 
plaintiff can satisfy both prongs of the inquiry. Id. Having concluded above that Defendants are 
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First and Eighth Amendment claims, this court also 
has determined that the defendants did not violated Plaintiff’s First and Eighth Amendment 
rights, and the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.
D. ADA Claims
In Claim Three, Plaintiff asserts he has epilepsy, seizure disorder, migraine disease, 
spinal stenosis, and diffuse disc disease. (Compl. at 32, ^ 33.) Plaintiff alleges he has been 
discriminated against by CDOC medical staff and the “named Defendants.” (Id., ^ 34.) Plaintiff 
also asserts the defendants have failed to recognize his disability, refused to give him a bottom 
bunk restriction, and refused to provide work restrictions. (See id., ^  43-76.) Defendants
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argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA claim because Plaintiff 
does not have a qualifying disability.3 (See Doc. Nos. 151 at 7; 152 at 8-9; 158 at 7.)
Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights under Title II of the ADA.4 Title II provides that 
“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be . . . subjected to 
discrimination by any such [public] entity.”5 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Three methods of proving 
discrimination are usually available to a plaintiff alleging a violation of Title II of the ADA: “(1) 
intentional discrimination; (2) discriminatory impact; and (3) a refusal to make a reasonable 
modification.”6 Swenson v. Lincoln County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 260 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1144 (D. 
Wyo. 2003); see Robertson v. Las Animas County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th 
Cir. 2007).
3 Defendants filed three separate motions for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA 
claim, each on behalf of different defendants, with each of the three motions making similar 
arguments. Defendants also filed a separate motion seeking summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 
claim for punitive damages asserted under the ADA. This court declines to address each of the 
these motions because this court finds all of the defendants are entitled to summary judgment for 
Plaintiff’s failure to prove the elements necessary to state an ADA claim.
4 Title II of the ADA applies to state prisons and prison services. Penn. Dep’t o f Corr. v. 
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
5 42 U.S.C. § 12132 also prohibits exclusion from participation in or denial of “the 
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity” by reason of disability. 
However, based on the factual allegations in the Complaint, only the discrimination prong of § 
12132 is applicable.
6 The term “reasonable accommodation” derives from the language of Title I of the ADA, 
which differs from Title II’s use of the term “reasonable modifications,” but the Tenth Circuit 
“has used the terms interchangeably, referring to an individual’s request for a ‘modification’ 
under Title II as a request for ‘accommodation.’ ” Robertson, 500 F.3d at 1195 n.8.
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However, not every claim advanced under the ADA by a prisoner alleging a lack of
adequate medical care is cognizable under that provision. The Tenth Circuit has stated:
[T]he failure to provide medical treatment to a disabled prisoner, while perhaps 
raising Eighth Amendment concerns in certain circumstances, does not constitute 
an ADA violation. See Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir.
1996)(concluding that the ADA “would not be violated by a prison’s simply 
failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners” and that the statute 
“does not create a remedy for medical malpractice”); McNally v. Prison Health 
Servs., 46 F. Supp. 2d 49, 58 (D. Me. 1999)(distinguishing between “claims that 
the medical treatment received for a disability was inadequate from claims that a 
prisoner has been denied access to services or programs because he is disabled,” 
and concluding that only the latter class of claims states an ADA violation).
Rashad v. Doughty, 4 F. Appx. 558, 560 (10th Cir. Jan. 29, 2001).
The court is persuaded that Plaintiff’s claims that he was deprived of a bottom bunk
restriction and refused work restrictions by the defendants are, in essence, claims of inadequate
medical care rather than a claim for a denial of access to services or programs that could
establish a violation of the ADA. Plaintiff has only conclusory alleged a denial of the CDOC’s
prison programs, and even that allegation is asserted as an Eighth Amendment violation. (See
Compl. at 38, ^ 17 [“Defendant Fortunato violated my 8th Amendment rights . . . . [and] the
deliberate refusal of prison officials to accomodate [sic] disability related needs . . . MEDICAL
CARE and virtually all other prison programs or activities.”].)
To the extent Plaintiff’ s claims truly are allegations that he has been discriminated
against in violation of the ADA, Plaintiff’s claim still fails. Defendants have provided the
Affidavit of Defendant Frantz, the Chief Medical Officer for the CDOC. (See Doc. No. 151-1.)
Defendant Frantz avers that on May 14, 2007, Plaintiff requested disability accommodations.
(Id., ^ 14.) The Request for Accommodation reflects that Plaintiff described his disabilities as
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“drug & alcohol addition, sleep apnea/cavernous hemangioma, degenerative disc disease, Pin 
[sic] in my left shoulder, traumatic brain injury, hearing in my right ear is failing, seizure 
disorder, migraine syndrome.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff’s disability accommodation screening was 
performed on June 14, 2007, and June 21, 2007, by Defendant Wermers. (Id., ^ 15; at 8-15.)
The records reflect that, after an extensive evaluation of all of Plaintiff’s medical complaints, 
Defendant Wermers’ found “that the [plaintiff] has NO disability(ties).” (Id. at 8; see also 
9-15.) On July 5, 2007, Defendant Frantz reviewed the screening records prepared by 
Defendant Wermers and verified that Plaintiff had no hearing, mobility, or other disability. (Id.,
^ 16; at 16.) On July 31, 2007, Defendant Frantz signed an Accommodation Resolution issued to 
Plaintiff wherein he was advised that qualifying disability pursuant to the ADA/Rehabilitation 
Acts and needed no accommodations. (Id., ^ 17; at 17.)
On March 6, 2009, Plaintiff was examined again for a mobility disability. (Id., ^ 18; at 
18-28.) Defendant Stock, the evaluating Physician Assistant, found that Plaintiff was not 
mobility disabled. (Id., ^ 18; at 28.) Defendant Frantz, after an examination on June 19, 2009, 
then verified that Plaintiff had no disabilities. (Id., ^ 19; at 29-32.) On August 24, 2009, 
Defendant Frantz signed an Accommodation Resolution issued to Plaintiff, wherein he was 
advised that it had been determined he did not have a qualifying mobility disability pursuant to 
the ADA. (Id., ^ 19; at 33.)
On June 8, 2010, Plaintiff requested accommodations and work restrictions for 
“arachnoid cyst tumors in brain occipital area causing vision problems, PTSD, photophobia, 
seizure disorder, migrain[e] headaches, [and] chronic lumbar disc disease.” (Id., ^ 21; at 34.)
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The disability screening was performed on July 5,2010, and July 15, 2010, by Gatbel Chamjock, 
PA-C, who found Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id., ^ 22; at 45.) Specifically, Physician Assistant 
Chamjock found Plaintiff “showed no evident [sic] of permanent disability on physical and ADL 
observation, though, he has tried to showed [sic] symptoms but they were non consistent.” (Id. 
at 45.) On July 19, 2010, Defendant Frantz reviewed the screening records prepared by 
Physician Assistant Chamjock and verified that Plaintiff has no disabilities. (Id., ^ 23; at 46-49.) 
On July 22, 2010, Defendant Frantz signed an Accommodation Resolution issued to Plaintiff, 
wherein he was advised that following a disability screening, it was determined he did not have a 
qualifying vision, mobility, or medical condition (seizures) disability pursuant to the ADA. (Id., 
^ 24; at 50.)
Defendants have met their initial burden of showing an absence of evidence to support 
Plaintiff’s claim that he has a qualifying disability. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.
However, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of providing evidence in this regard to 
demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on this matter. See Concrete Works, Inc., 36 F.3d at 1518. 
Thus, because the undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff does not have a qualifying disability 
under the ADA, his ADA claims must fail.
Nevertheless, even if Plaintiff had met his burden of showing he had a qualified 
disability, his ADA claim still fails because Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence, other 
than his conclusory allegations, that he has been discriminated against because of his alleged 
disability. As such, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA claim and 
on Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages associated with his ADA claim.
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WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the court respectfully
RECOMMENDS that
1. “Defendants Dr. Barry Goldsmith, Stephen Krebs, M.D., P.A Brian Webster, P.A. 
Tejinder Singh, Joseph Gary Fortunato, D.O., P.A. Jo Ann Stock, Nurse Nancy White, and CO 
Regina Johnson’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to Plaintiff’s Claim for 
Deprivation of Eighth Amendment Right to be Free from Cruel and Unusual Punishment” (Doc. 
No. 149) be GRANTED;
2. “Defendants Captain Winger, Major Johnson, Lt. Mark Bold, Lt. Shane 
McMahill, Lt. Jason Zwirn, CO St. Martin, P.A. Brian Webster, CO Kenneth Lefever, Sgt.
Becky Ball, and Lt. Jimerson’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to Plaintiff’s Claim 
for Retaliation and Exercise of First Amendment Protected Rights” (Doc. No. 150) be 
GRANTED;
3. “Defendant State of Colorado - Office of the Governor Bill Ritter’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff’s Remaining Claim Against Defendant Governor Ritter - 
Official Capacity for Deprivation of Rights Secured by the Americans with Disabilities Act” 
(Doc. No. 151) be GRANTED;
4. “Defendants Dr. Barry Goldsmith, Paula Frantz, M.D., C.M.O., Stephen Krebs, 
M.D., Joseph Gary Fortunato, D.O., P.A. Brian Webster, P.A. Tejender Singh, P.A. JoAnn 
Stock, and Joseph J. Wermers’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff’s Claim for 
Deprivation of Rights Secured by the Americans with Disabilities Act” (Doc. No. 152) be 
GRANTED;
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5. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to Plaintiffs Claim for 
Punitive Damages for Deprivation of Rights Secured by the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(Doc. No. 155) be GRANTED;
6. Defendants Aristedes Zavaras, Cathie Holst, Adrienne Jacobson, and Ms. 
Heverly’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to Plaintiff’s Claim for Deprivation of 
Rights Secured by the Americans with Disabilities Act (Doc. No. 158) be GRANTED; and
7. Plaintiff’s Complaint and this case be dismissed in its entirety.
ADVISEMENT TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen days after service of a copy of the Recommendation, any party may 
serve and file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and 
recommendations with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. 
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); In re Griego, 64 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1995). A 
general objection that does not put the district court on notice of the basis for the objection will 
not preserve the objection for de novo review. “[A] party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s 
report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo 
review by the district court or for appellate review.” United States v. One Parcel o f Real Prop. 
Known As 2121 East 30th Street, Tulsa, Okla., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Failure to 
make timely objections may bar de novo review by the district judge of the magistrate judge’s 
proposed findings and recommendations and will result in a waiver of the right to appeal from a 
judgment of the district court based on the proposed findings and recommendations of the 
magistrate judge. See Vega v. Suthers, 195 F.3d 573, 579-80 (10th Cir. 1999) (a district court’s
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decision to review a magistrate judge’s recommendation de novo despite the lack of an objection 
does not preclude application of the “firm waiver rule”); One Parcel o f Real Prop., 73 F.3d at 
1059-60 (a party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be both 
timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate 
review); In t’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Wyo. Coal Ref. Sys., Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir. 
1995) (by failing to object to certain portions of the magistrate judge’s order, cross-claimant had 
waived its right to appeal those portions of the ruling); Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342, 
1352 (10th Cir. 1992) (by their failure to file objections, plaintiffs waived their right to appeal 
the magistrate judge’s ruling); but see, Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review).
Dated this 22nd day of April, 2011.
BY THE COURT:
Kathleen M  Tafoya 
United States Magistrate Judge
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